Since the gallery began publishing in English on its official website, messages have started to arrive from artists and others abroad. Painters, photographers, sculptors. The content and format vary widely, but as I read through them, I noticed a structure they shared.
Every sender had set out in their email the subject of their work, their motivation, the materials and techniques they use, and the questions they meant to raise. All of this was carefully put into words. And yet what reached me was not what the sender had intended. There was a gap between the text in the portfolio and the photographs of the work.
“Does the work achieve what the text says it does?” After reading the explanation, it is not impossible to see it that way. Before reading the text, it does not look that way.
This is not to say that the senders’ explanations were wrong. The explanations probably describe the artists’ intentions accurately. But stating an intention and having that intention fulfilled in the work are two different things.
This gap becomes material for judging how to read a work. Is it that the words have not caught up with the work, or that the work has not caught up with the words? If the former, words can be supplied later. If the latter, there is nothing to be done.
The Moment of Making, the Moment of Appearing
“Encoding/Decoding,” which Stuart Hall contributed to Culture, Media, Language in 1980, is a short paper, a little over ten pages. Its subject is television broadcasting, but the structure it lays out has been put to use well beyond the bounds of media studies.[1]
What Hall criticised was the view of communication as a linear model of sender, message and receiver. In that view, what matters is whether the message arrived correctly. If it did not, either it was poorly conveyed or the receiver lacked the capacity to understand it.
Hall reframed the process. He described it as a chain of moments, each with its own specific conditions: production, circulation, distribution/consumption and reproduction. Each moment is indispensable to the circuit as a whole, but none can fully guarantee the next moment to which it is linked.
It was argued earlier that since there is no necessary correspondence between encoding and decoding, the former can attempt to “pre-fer” but cannot prescribe or guarantee the latter, which has its own conditions of existence.[1]
He set this out as the pair encoding and decoding. A message is encoded and sent, and decoded on the receiver’s side. But the code used in encoding and the code used in decoding are not necessarily the same. There is “no necessary correspondence” between them.
What Hall avoided here was treating the gap as an accident. What we call misunderstanding or distortion arises from the asymmetry between the positions occupied by those who encode and those who decode, not from any deficiency in the receiver. Hall rejected explanations that reduce the variation in readings to individual psychology as “selective perception.” Readings, he argued, are neither individual nor random; beyond individual differences, they form significant clusters.
Hall distinguished three decoding positions: the dominant-hegemonic, the negotiated and the oppositional. A dominant reading takes the message as given, within the frame the sender has set. A negotiated reading accepts the sender’s definitions in broad terms while making exceptions suited to one’s own situation. An oppositional reading understands the sender’s intention fully and then reads it within an alternative frame.
Polysemy must not, however, be confused with pluralism. Connotative codes are not equal among themselves. Any society/culture tends, with varying degrees of closure, to impose its classifications of the social and cultural and political world.[1]
Hall also stresses that signs are polysemic, while insisting that polysemy must not be confused with pluralism. Every society has arrangements that privilege certain readings, which he calls the “preferred reading.” Readings are open, but they are not equivalent.
Hall writes about “naturalised codes.” Because visual signs appear less arbitrary than linguistic ones, the very presence of a code becomes invisible. What this shows is that the code has become deeply habitual, not that the sign is transparent. When something feels self-evident at a glance, the viewer may simply be using up an existing code.
This point is likely to be troublesome for those who make works. What you have made appears to you as something self-evident at a glance. That a code is at work there is hardest to see for the person who made it.
What the Artist Cannot Control
Back to the materials sent to the gallery. The artist encodes their own work: what to make, how to make it, what its subject will be. They then write a statement, prepare documentation and explain the context. This work is in the artist’s hands. But before whom, and within what frame, the work will appear does not remain in the artist’s hands alone.
The same work, placed somewhere else, gives rise to a different interpretation. Who hangs beside it, what the event it belongs to is called, in which language the explanation is given, by what route the viewer arrived. All of these make up the conditions under which the work is interpreted. Part of the gallery’s work is to set those conditions: to decide which works to entrust to the interpretation of others, and under what conditions.
This asymmetry is not limited to art. But the artist’s intention is clear, and the explanation is thorough. So if the work does not get through, the artist concludes that the explanation was insufficient, or that the receiver failed to read it. And so the statement grows thicker. Yet the statement, too, is an encoded text, and it is decoded with the same slippage.
What Hall wrote about television comes into play here. He observed that producers who find their message “failing to get across” tend to treat it as a matter of straightening out kinks in the communication chain. Literal misunderstandings do exist. But more often, he wrote, broadcasters are concerned that the audience has failed to take the meaning as they intended, and what they really mean to say is that viewers are not operating within the “dominant” or “preferred” code. Their ideal is “perfectly transparent communication.” What they actually have to confront is “systematically distorted communication.”
The same thing is happening on the side of those who send out works. They assume their own encoding is transparent. And when it turns out not to be, they process it as a failure of communication.
When Decoding Becomes Encoding
What Hall analysed was a structure in which television had a centre: the broadcaster. You could see who was doing the encoding. Public or commercial, there were institutions, professions and production routines. Hall called this the “professional code” and analysed how it operates within the hegemony of the dominant code. This structure, however, has been changed by the internet.
MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: BELANCIEGE, a video work by Hito Steyerl with Giorgi Gago Gagoshidze and Miloš Trakilović, was shown at the Neuer Berliner Kunstverein in 2019.[2] What it presented was a situation in which people no longer sit in front of screens consuming information, but have themselves become nodes in a network overflowing with cultural content. Reading and sending are no longer separate.
In Hall’s schema, decoding stood at the end of the circuit. Meaning was taken, converted into social practice, and the circuit closed.
Thus – to borrow Marx’s terms – circulation and reception are, indeed, “moments” of the production process in television and are reincorporated, via a number of skewed and structured “feedbacks”, into the production process itself. The consumption or reception of the television message is thus also itself a “moment” of the production process in its larger sense.[1]
Hall himself writes that reception is also a moment of production. But what he meant was a detour through the centre of the broadcaster: ratings and images of the audience flowing back into the institution and conditioning the next schedule.
What happens now is likes, shares and forwards. A reaction becomes the next transmission. Without any detour, decoding moves directly into the position of encoding. And each of these acts is simultaneously recorded as data, accumulated, and used to decide what will appear next, and before whom. What Steyerl and her collaborators pointed out was that a new form of exploitation is at work here. The meaning, content and success of a brand are produced by the unpaid labour of users themselves. It is hard to trace, and hard to stop.
Under these conditions, the way preferred readings are made changes. This does not mean that no one is setting anything. What to optimise for, which metrics to measure by, which options to compare: these are designed in advance. What the method known as A/B testing formalises is a loop that, within such a design, reads from response data which option better met the goal, and feeds that back into the next delivery.
Those who set the conditions (platforms, businesses) and those who generate the data that decides what is preferred under those conditions (users) are not the same. The frame is designed; the content is updated after the fact. It is this separation that makes the question “who sets the code?” so hard to answer.
Writing about the work by Steyerl and her collaborators, Reichert puts it as follows:
theory for a world of preventive crime prediction and anticipatory governance, where images no longer represent but predict and manufacture reality, and where people don’t simply sit in front of screens anymore but are themselves nodes in a network flooded with cultural content that they consume and forward.[2]
Another inversion that Steyerl and her collaborators show is relevant here. Images “no longer represent but predict and manufacture reality.” An image made by predicting what will spread does spread, and that spread decides what will be made next. The distinction between representation and production stops working.
And when anyone can transmit, and a mechanism intervenes to decide what is delivered to whom, something else happens. The dominant code has become smaller and more numerous. It would not be accurate, I think, to read the so-called filter bubble as the disappearance of the dominant code. Within each bubble, preferred readings still function, and readings that depart from them are treated as “not getting it.” In the structure Hall analysed, oppositional reading was possible: a way of reading that understood the dominant code and then transposed it into another frame. For opposition to be possible, the code to be opposed must be shared. Within a bubble, that condition weakens, because within the cluster one belongs to, one’s own reading is easily experienced as if it were dominant. The opponent becomes hard to see. And when bubbles touch, what happens falls short even of an oppositional reading. They collide, each without understanding the other’s code. In that situation, negotiation cannot take place. That the phrase “if you think about it with common sense” has fallen out of use may be a symptom of this change. Appeals to common sense only work on the premise that the other person holds the same map. Whether we like it or not, this is what society looks like now.
What We Do Not Take On
In such an environment, before whom, and within what frame, does a work appear? It is possible to describe a gallery’s job as the business of taking in works and selling them. But most of the work actually done is something else. Whom to place beside whom. In what order to show things. What text to attach, or not to attach. In which language to publish. Whether to present something as an exhibition, put it on the website, write about it in the journal, or take it to an art fair. All of this is the work of setting the conditions under which works appear. Here lies something equivalent to what Hall called the professional code. Those conditions are set most strongly by what one declines to take on.
The judgement not to take on a work is made as an assessment of an individual work. But as such judgements accumulate, they define what kind of place it is. Its outline is drawn not by inclusion but by exclusion. Deciding not to take on a certain work defines the place as one that does not take on such work. And that definition becomes part of the conditions under which the works it does take on appear.
Whatever the extent of its influence, this is a structure of power.
It is rarely stated openly. The criteria for selection are internal; from outside, only the results are visible. The works taken on can be seen; the works not taken on cannot. So what defines the place can only be guessed at from outside.
Operating without stating these criteria has a cost. When criteria exist only internally, they loosen in practice. If you keep expanding what you can take on, your options increase in the short term. But as the judgement not to take things on weakens, what kind of place it is fades too.
Setting the conditions under which works appear also includes attaching words to them. When the words have not caught up with what a work is trying to say, words can be made later. What is involved is preparing, in another form, the conditions under which the work can be decoded. It does not mean speaking on behalf of the artist’s intention. Yet the fact that words can be supplied later does not guarantee that those words will enrich the work. There are two ways in which words can damage a work: by supplying what is not in the work, and by closing off what is. The former disguises the work’s achievement; the latter fixes it too firmly. When the work has not yet arrived, no amount of added words will change the conditions. When the work has already arrived, adding words can narrow it.
But judging whether a work has “arrived” is itself an act of decoding. A gallery’s professional code, like the naturalised codes Hall describes, is hardest to see for those who use it. aaploit once judged the achievement of a work at the level of question and concept. Under that code, works that stand by the sheer presence of the picture plane were read as not yet having arrived. The reason for not taking them on did not lie with the works.
There are two reasons for not taking on a work: when the work does not meet the conditions, and when the gallery does not yet have the means to take it on without damaging it. The latter can change with experience. Having experienced how words can close off a work, and having found a way of writing that does not close it off, the range of works we could take on widened. The judgement not to take something on is made together with one’s own code, and with the limits of one’s own way of speaking.
In Closing
Writing and publishing this text becomes part of the very work discussed here: putting into words, and into the open, the criteria that decide what is taken on and what is not. That act is itself the work of defining what kind of place this is. It is self-referential, but that is not a weakness. Whoever sets the conditions of encoding must take responsibility for setting them. That responsibility goes beyond stating the criteria. Words can open a work, and they can also close off what the work has already opened. That responsibility also means discerning the difference, and acknowledging that the limits of one’s own way of speaking determine the range of what one can take on.
What Hall showed is that there is no necessary correspondence between encoding and decoding. This essay, too, will probably not be read as it was written. I think of that less as a failure than as a structure.
[1] Stuart Hall, “Encoding/decoding,” in Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (eds.), Culture, Media, Language, London: Hutchinson, 1980, pp. 128–38.
[2] Hito Steyerl, Giorgi Gago Gagoshidze, Miloš Trakilović, MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: BELANCIEGE, 2019, video, 45 min. For a discussion of the work, see Kolja Reichert, “The TRUMP-BALENCIAGA Complex,” 032c, May 13, 2020, https://032c.com/magazine/the-trump-balenciaga-complex